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RESTORING THE HISTORICAL RULE OF
LENITY AS A CANON
SHON HOPWOOD*
In criminal law, the venerated rule of lenity has been frequently, if not consistently,
invoked as a canon of interpretation. Where criminal statutes are ambiguous, the
rule of lenity generally posits that courts should interpret them narrowly, in favor of
the defendant. But the rule is not always reliably used, and questions remain about
its application. In this article, I will try to determine how the rule of lenity should
apply and whether it should be given the status of a canon.
First, I argue that federal courts should apply the historical rule of lenity (also
known as the rule of strict construction of penal statutes) that applied prior to the
1970s, when the Supreme Court significantly weakened the rule. The historical rule
requires a judge to consult the text, linguistic canons, and the structure of the statute
and then, if reasonable doubts remain, interpret the statute in the defendant’s favor.
Conceived this way, the historical rule cuts off statutory purpose and legislative
history from the analysis, and places a thumb on the scale in favor of interpreting
statutory ambiguities narrowly in relation to the severity of the punishment that a
statute imposes. As compared to the modern version of the rule of lenity, the histor-
ical rule of strict construction better advances democratic accountability, protects
individual liberty, furthers the due process principle of fair warning, and aligns with
the modified version of textualism practiced by much of the federal judiciary today.
Second, I argue that the historical rule of lenity should be deemed an interpretive
canon and given stare decisis effect by all federal courts. If courts consistently
applied historical lenity, it would require more clarity from Congress and less
guessing from courts, and it would ameliorate some of the worst excesses of the
federal criminal justice system, such as overcriminalization and overincarceration.
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INTRODUCTION
A well-worn debate between textualism and purposivism has
dominated the literature on statutory construction for decades.1 From
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 2–31 (2016); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018) (observing the long-running debate
about textualism versus purposivism); David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105
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the silt of that contentious debate, the federal judiciary has largely
settled on a middle-ground approach. Judges seeking to interpret a
law will look first to the statutory text and try to surmise its meaning
by drawing on dictionary definitions, caselaw, and linguistic canons of
construction; if the meaning remains unclear, judges consider the law’s
general purpose and legislative history; and finally, in a criminal case,
if ambiguity remains after all other tools have been exhausted, judges
may apply the rule of lenity and give the defendant the benefit of the
doubt as to the statute’s meaning. But this middle-ground form of tex-
tualism2 has by no means quieted scholarly debate about the appro-
priate methods and priorities of statutory interpretation. It has merely
changed its focus.3
Much of the focus in scholarship on statutory interpretation has
shifted to the proper use of individual rules and canons of interpreta-
tion. As Abbe R. Gluck and Judge Richard Posner have noted,
“canons are back at the forefront of academic attention.”4 In this
Article, I make two contributions to this discussion, both concerning
the rule of lenity, which posits that ambiguous criminal statutes must
be construed narrowly to favor criminal defendants. First, this Article
answers a question asked by Justice Brett Kavanaugh about how the
rule of lenity should be applied.5 Federal courts should apply the his-
torical rule of lenity—also known as the “rule of strict construction of
penal statutes”—that applied prior to the 1970s, when the Supreme
CORNELL L. REV. 137, 148 (2019) (noting that the “debates about textualism and
purposivism . . . have often dominated (and sometimes exhausted) the field” of
interpretation).
2 See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation:
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2058 (2017) (“All
sides have significantly moderated and largely have converged on a middle-ground, text-
focused position that, for most practitioners and judges . . . includes recourse to broader
context, including, in disciplined fashion . . . legislative materials.”).
3 In this Article, I set aside the larger jurisprudential debates about statutory
interpretation theory. Instead, I focus on how judges currently use canons of construction
as a doctrinal matter in a new landscape where modified and moderated textualism
appears to be practiced by much of the federal bench. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at
1300–01 (“[T]he Court and many academics have been mired for decades in a by-now
boring debate about ‘textualism’ versus ‘purposivism.’ That debate, while ostensibly about
the judge’s relationship to Congress and its work, has centered in practice on little more
than the most appropriate evidentiary tools of interpretation . . . .”).
4 Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1322.
5 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2145
n.136 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“I do not
have a firm idea about how to handle the rule of lenity.”). But see Shular v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 779, 789 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he rule of lenity applies when a
court employs all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation and, after doing so,
concludes that the statute still remains grievously ambiguous, meaning that the court can
make no more than a guess as to what the statute means.”).
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Court considerably weakened the rule. Second, this Article argues
that the historical rule should be deemed an interpretive “canon” and
given stare decisis effect.
As I have detailed elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s current rule of
lenity diverges significantly from historical practice.6 The current rule
only applies after a court has canvassed every possible interpretive
rule or shred of evidence for congressional intent and, even then, only
in cases in which that multitude of evidence leaves “grievous ambi-
guity” about the statute’s meaning.7 As a result, the canon rarely
applies because judges have a nearly endless set of interpretive tools
to resolve ambiguity. At best, the current rule is a makeweight,
invoked after the judge has already decided on the best reading of a
criminal statute—similar to Justice Elena Kagan’s description of legis-
lative history as “extra icing on a cake already frosted.”8 At its worst,
the invocation of lenity provides only atmospherics; it neither decides
cases nor protects defendants from convictions and long prison
sentences when a statute is unclear.
The historical rule of lenity, or the rule of strict construction of
penal statutes, functions differently. It resolves the ordering problem
by requiring a judge to consult the text, linguistic canons, and the
structure of the statute, and then, if reasonable doubts remain, inter-
pret the statute in the defendant’s favor. Unlike the modern rule, the
historical rule cuts off statutory purpose and legislative history from
the analysis. The historical rule also places a thumb on the scale in
favor of interpreting statutory ambiguities narrowly vis-à-vis the
severity of the punishment that a statute imposes. As compared to the
modern version of the rule of lenity, the historical rule of strict con-
struction better advances democratic accountability, protects indi-
vidual liberty, furthers the due process principle of fair warning, and
aligns with the modified version of textualism practiced by much of
the federal judiciary today.
Applying the historical rule of lenity is of more than academic
importance; it has significant human impact. In 1993, the Supreme
Court issued a decision in Deal v. United States9 interpreting a statute
that prohibits using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or
a drug crime. Deal had committed multiple robberies while using a
gun and faced six charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm
6 See Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 720 (2017)
(explaining that the current rule of lenity is a “significant erosion” of past practices).
7 Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (quoting Maracich v.
Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013)).
8 Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 557 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
9 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
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during a crime of violence.10 Under the statute, each “second or sub-
sequent conviction” imposed a twenty-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence; the sentences would run consecutively to each other and to a
five-year sentence for the first offense.11 This provision triggered a
105-year prison sentence for Deal.12 Lower courts had noted that the
statute was “not a model of clarity” and that it was ambiguous
whether it was meant to penalize a first-time offender who commits
multiple violations over the course of several offenses or only a
second-time offender who commits a violation after having previously
been convicted and sentenced under the provision.13
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, acknowledged that the term
“conviction” in § 924(c) was susceptible to multiple meanings.14 Yet
he interpreted the statute in favor of the prosecution and concluded
that the requisite “second or subsequent conviction” could occur in
the same prosecution.15 The Court thus construed § 924(c) in favor of
the government,16 even though the statute was unclear and imposed
long sentences.17 This single interpretive misstep caused many defen-
dants to receive draconian sentences for stacked § 924(c) convic-
tions.18 For example, Adam Clausen received a 213-year sentence for
10 Id. at 130.
11 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988).
12 Deal, 508 U.S. at 137.
13 United States v. Godwin, 758 F. Supp. 281, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (declining to impose
a twenty-year sentence on a first-time offender who pled guilty to two violations under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), noting the ambiguity of the statute); see also Rachel E. Moore, Giving
It Another Shot: A Reexamination of the “Second or Subsequent Conviction” Language of
the Firearm Possession Sentencing Statute, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1005, 1011–16 (2011)
(describing a circuit split on the question of whether the twenty-year mandatory minimum
applied to first-time offenders with multiple violations).
14 Deal, 508 U.S. at 131.
15 Id. at 131–32.
16 Id. at 135 (“[I]t cannot possibly be said that it requires a criminal act after the first
conviction. What it requires is a conviction after the first conviction. There is utterly no
ambiguity in that, and hence no occasion to invoke the rule of lenity.”).
17 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 740–41.
18 In 2016 alone, 156 people received multiple and stacked § 924(c) convictions. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR FIREARMS OFFENSES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2018); see also Paul Cassell, How Mandatory
Minimum Reform Will Work with “Stacked” Charges, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Nov. 19, 2018, 10:32 AM), https://reason.com/2018/11/19/how-mandatory-minimum-
reform-will-work-w (lamenting that the author, as a federal judge, was obliged to impose
excessively harsh punishments on first-time offenders, noting that “a single episode of
criminal behavior could earn a defendant 55 years (or more) of stacked up federal prison
time, even when virtually no one thought that such a sentence was appropriate”);
Jason Pye, “Unjust, Cruel, and Even Irrational”: Stacking Charges Under 924(c),
FREEDOMWORKS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/%E2%80%9Cun
just-cruel-and-even-irrational%E2%80%9D-stacking-charges-under-924c (describing
congressional attempts to prevent the stacking of charges under § 924(c)).
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using firearms during nine robberies in which no one was physically
harmed,19 and Weldon Angelos received a fifty-five-year sentence for
carrying a firearm while he made three small sales of marijuana.20
Twenty-five years later, Congress finally overrode the Supreme
Court’s interpretation with the First Step Act of 2018.21 Had the Court
properly applied the rule of strict construction, § 924(c) would have
been construed more narrowly, and scores of people would not have
received unspeakably harsh sentences.22
The rule of lenity should also be recognized as an interpretive
“canon,” which means that it would apply to all cases of statutory
ambiguity in federal criminal law and be given stare decisis effect in
lower courts. There is some disagreement about which of the current
interpretive rules should receive the special status of “canon.”23 Anita
Krishnakumar and Victoria Nourse have provided several factors to
determine whether a particular interpretive rule deserves canon
status, including frequency of invocation, longevity, justification, and
whether the Supreme Court has declared it to be generally appli-
cable.24 Justice Kavanaugh, in an article authored while a judge on the
D.C. Circuit, was skeptical of the judiciary’s overdependence on
canons of construction that could increase, rather than decrease, the
consistency and predictability of statutory interpretation.25 By any of
19 Hopwood, supra note 6, at 707.
20 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230–31 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d,
433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
21 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22
(2018) (replacing “second or subsequent conviction under this subsection” with “violation
of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this subsection has become
final”). The First Step Act reduced the penalties of several federal sentencing provisions
and provided a new earned time provision for those in federal prison who successfully
complete rehabilitation programs. See id. sec. 401 (reducing mandatory penalties under the
Controlled Substances Act and Controlled Substances Import and Export Act from twenty
to fifteen years); id. sec. 101, § 3632(d)(4) (providing earned time credits for prisoners who
complete recidivism reduction programming).
22 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 740–41.
23 See Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV.
163 (2018) (describing divergences between two different volumes on canonical
interpretations); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90
B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010) (arguing that substantive canons are reconcilable with the faithful
agency model of judging only to the extent that they advance values expressed in the
Constitution and respect the outer limits of statutory language).
24 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 179–90.
25 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2135–44 (arguing against the application of canons
which require a threshold finding of ambiguity, noting that the indeterminacy of the clear/
ambiguous determination leads to unpredictable outcomes). See generally Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“Rudimentary
justice requires that those subject to the laws must have the means of knowing what it
prescribes. . . . Predictability . . . is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the
name.”); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 145 (2000) (“[T]he
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these measures, the rule of lenity deserves the special status of an
interpretive “canon.”
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current
rule of lenity and contrasts it with the historical rule. Part II explains
that the historical rule of lenity is normatively superior to the current
version because it better advances democratic accountability, protects
individual liberty, furthers the due process principle of fair warning,
and aligns with the modified version of textualism. Part III argues that
the Supreme Court should treat the historical rule of lenity as a canon,
applying it to all cases of statutory ambiguity and giving it stare decisis
effect in lower courts. Part IV concludes by suggesting that a stricter
rule of lenity would help to resolve some of the most vexing questions
that arise in interpreting federal criminal statutes.
I
THE HISTORICAL RULE OF LENITY DIFFERS
SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S
PRESENT-DAY RULE OF LENITY
The modern-day rule of lenity derives from a historical rule of
interpretation known as the “strict construction of penal statutes,”
which I will refer to as the rule of strict construction or the historical
rule of lenity. As I have explained elsewhere, the historical rule of
lenity functioned differently and better safeguarded a defendant’s lib-
erty and the separation of powers than the Supreme Court’s current,
weakened version.26
A. The History of the Rule of Lenity in Early American Courts
The historical rule of lenity derives from an even earlier doctrine
called the benefit of clergy—a doctrine of leniency that originated in
thirteenth-century England, where the death penalty was imposed for
many, even non-violent, crimes.27 Courts developed the “benefit of
clergy” doctrine to spare those charged with trivial offenses from cap-
ital punishment. Under the doctrine, the judge would ask a defendant
to recite a few verses from the Bible.28 If the defendant did so success-
fully, his case would be transferred to an ecclesiastic jurisdiction,
where he would be sentenced to one year in prison instead of execu-
maxims and techniques of interpretive choice should push judges toward applying a small,
cheap, relatively stable, and inflexible set of interpretive sources and doctrines in a rule-
bound (formalist) way.”).
26 Hopwood, supra note 6, at 738–42.
27 Id. at 714.
28 Id.
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tion.29 The benefit of clergy doctrine allowed courts to mitigate what
they viewed as overly punitive sanctions.30
During the reign of Henry VIII, who executed thousands of his
subjects, Parliament passed numerous statutes that excluded the ben-
efit of clergy.31 To compensate, courts—unwilling to see pickpockets
hung—created the rule of strict construction.32
The rule of strict construction crossed the Atlantic into American
statutory interpretation and was first acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in a 1795 opinion.33 The Marshall Court, however, was the first
to meaningfully discuss it, in United States v. Wiltberger,34 which
addressed the scope of Sections 8 and 12 of the Crimes Act of 1790.
Section 8 established the death penalty for certain felonies committed
“upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the
jurisdiction of any particular state.”35 Section 12, enacted later, man-
dated a sentence of up to three years for manslaughter committed on
the “high seas.”36 The government charged Wiltberger with commit-
ting manslaughter on the river Tigris, raising the question of whether
the river was included in “the high seas” within the meaning of
Section 12.37
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged
that Congress may not have intended to create a loophole for man-
slaughter by limiting the Court’s jurisdiction over it to only the “high
29 Id.; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975).
30 Hopwood, supra note 6, at 714.
31 Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV.
748, 749 (1935) (describing that principals and accessories before the fact were excluded
from the benefit of the clergy in a number of serious felonies).
32 See id. at 750 (“It was against this background of unmitigated severity in serious
crimes that the doctrine of strict construction emerged.”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198 & n.23 (1985)
(“Faced with a vast and irrational proliferation of capital offenses, judges invented strict
construction to stem the march to the gallows. Sometimes aptly called the rule of lenity,
strict construction was literally ‘in favorem vitae’—part of a ‘veritable conspiracy for
administrative nullification’ of capital penalization.” (quoting Hall, supra note 31, at 751));
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Oversized Frauds, Undersized Fish, and Deconstruction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 17, 20 n.24 (2014) (“The king could commute a sentence,
but Henry VIII is reputed to have executed 72,000 subjects . . . so any gathering of his
clemency recipients would have fit into a Mini Cooper.”).
33 See United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 45 (1795) (“[W]henever a new
remedy is so introduced, (more especially in a case so highly penal) it must be strictly
pursued.”). The earliest case invoking lenity appears to be Bray v. Atalanta, 4 F. Cas. 37,
38 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 1819) (“[I]t is a penal law and must be construed strictly.”).
34 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
35 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (1790).
36 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 93–94.
37 See id. at 77, 84.
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seas.”38 But, applying the rule of strict construction of penal statutes,
he refused to fix the statute by “engrafting” the language from Section
8—in which the Court’s jurisdiction extended to “any river, haven,
basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state”—onto
Section 12.39 Marshall also argued that legislative intent should not be
consulted in a case, such as this one, in which the “plain meaning of
words” leaves “no ambiguity.”40 He warned that it was “dangerous”
to add extratextual elements to a statute simply because the conduct
“is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those [crimes]
which are enumerated.”41 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the
rule of strict construction prevented courts from creating common law
crimes and described it as being “founded on the tenderness of the
law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department.”42 As a result, the Court held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over Wiltberger’s manslaughter charge.43
Following Wiltberger, the Supreme Court continued to apply the
rule of strict construction, holding that a criminal statute could not be
interpreted to extend “beyond the plain meaning of its words”44 and
that a statute’s intention “must be gathered from the words.”45 By the
end of the nineteenth century, treatise writers had settled on an
understanding of how the rule would apply. The rule reflected a
strong preference for individual liberty and against excessive punish-
ments, and it protected these values by narrowly construing a statute
anytime the “plain meaning” of the statutory language was “reason-
38 Id. at 99.
39 Id. at 94, 99, 105.
40 Id. at 95–96 (“The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in
departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an
intention which the words themselves did not suggest.”).
41 Id. at 96.
42 Id. at 95 (“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment.”); see also, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the notion of a common-law crime is utterly anathema today”);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity.”). The rule traces its lineage to an earlier Marshall Court decision,
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that, in order for the
federal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction, “[t]he legislative authority of the Union
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall
have jurisdiction of the offence”).
43 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 105–06.
44 United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464, 475 (1840).
45 United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 396 (1867).
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ably open to question,” especially in cases where the punishment was
particularly harsh.46 In the words of Joel Prentiss Bishop:
[S]tatutes which subject one to a punishment or penalty, or to for-
feiture, or a summary process calculated to take away his opportu-
nity of making a full defen[s]e, or in any way deprive him of his
liberty, are to be construed strictly. And the degree of strictness will
depend somewhat on the severity of the punishment they inflict.47
J.G. Sutherland further explained that the rule of strict construction
prohibited courts from interpreting otherwise clear statutes with refer-
ence to the legislature’s purpose for enacting them.48 But unlike the
English benefit-of-clergy rule, the American rule of strict construction
was thought to be consistent with legislative intent on the view that a
legislature “does not intend the infliction of punishment, or to inter-
fere with the liberty or rights of the citizen,” except where it
“express[es] itself clearly.”49
The rule of strict construction typically applied as follows. First, a
court would consult the statutory text, linguistic canons, and structure.
Then, if there was a reasonable doubt50 about the statute’s meaning
46 See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 349–50, at
438–41 (1891) (noting that the rule of strict construction mandates that “every provision
affecting any element of a criminal offense involving life or liberty is subject to the strictest
interpretation,” and that “this consideration presses with increasing weight according to
the severity of the penalty”).
47 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES;
INCLUDING THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL. WHAT IS
SPECIAL TO THE CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY OFFENCES AS TO BOTH
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 193, at 186 (2d ed. 1883); see also id. § 196, at 189 (“While the
parts of a penal statute which subject to punishment or a penalty are, from their odious
nature, to be construed strictly, those which exempt from penal consequences will, because
of their opposite character, receive a liberal interpretation.”).
48 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, § 350, at 439–40 (“Although a case may be within
the mischief intended to be remedied by a penal act, that fact affords no sufficient reason
for construing it so as to extend it to cases not within the correct and ordinary meaning of
its language.”).
49 Id.; see also BISHOP, supra note 47, § 189(c), at 179 (“It being a primary function of
all laws to maintain the rights of individuals and the public, statutes taking any of them
away, even where not unconstitutional, are to be strictly construed.”).
50 See, e.g., Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 396 (noting that whether an action violates a statute
must be based on the statute’s words, and that “they must be such as to leave no room for a
reasonable doubt upon the subject”); Harrison v. Vose, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 372, 378 (1850)
(“In the construction of a penal statute, it is well settled . . . that all reasonable doubts
concerning its meaning ought to operate in favor of the [defendant].”); see also BISHOP,
supra note 47, § 218, at 205 (“If, in a criminal case requiring the strict construction of a
statute, the court entertains a reasonable doubt of its meaning, this doubt will prevail in
favor of the accused.”); SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, § 348, at 437–38 n.6 (“[W]e are thus
far bound to a strict construction in a penal statute, that if there be a fair and reasonable
doubt, we must act as in revenue cases, where the rule is, that the subject is not to be taxed
without clear words for that purpose.” (quoting Nicholson v. Fields (1862) 158 Eng. Rep.
695, 699; 7 H. & N. 810, 817 (Pollock, C.B.))).
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and ambiguity remained about what Congress intended, the court
would construe it in favor of the defendant.51 Stated differently, a
court would not contemplate the likely purpose of the statute or its
legislative history52 in resolving ambiguity.53 Courts would also apply
a thumb on the scale in favor of a narrow interpretation if the punish-
ment was more severe.54 In cases where the punishment was great,
lenity would require a closer “degree of strictness” from Congress.55
B. The Supreme Court’s Current Approach to the Rule of Lenity
At least in name, the rule of strict construction lasted until 1943,
when Justice Felix Frankfurter rebranded it as the “rule of lenity” and
changed it into the rule that the Supreme Court (along with many
lower courts) employs today. Writing for the majority in Callanan v.
United States, Frankfurter asserted that the rule of lenity should only
come “into operation at the end of the process of construing what
Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consid-
eration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”56 He suggested that the his-
51 See, e.g., Erbaugh v. United States, 173 F. 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1909) (“[T]he
punishment [the penal statute] prescribes is severe, and a penal statute which creates and
denounces a new offense should be strictly construed. . . . [O]ne who was not beyond
reasonable doubt within the class . . . may not be brought within that class after the event
by interpretation.”); see also BISHOP, supra note 47, § 194, at 187 (“Such statutes are to
reach no further in meaning than their words; no person is to be made subject to them by
implication, and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of
the accused.”); SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, § 353, at 443–44 (“[I]f there is such an
ambiguity in a penal statute as to leave reasonable doubts of its meaning, it is the duty of a
court not to inflict the penalty.”).
52 To be clear, there was no mention of legislative history likely because it was “not
widely used prior to the twentieth century.” Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never
Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1992).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 119, 121 (1817) (concluding
that penal laws should not be expansively construed to cover cases outside those reached
by the ordinary meaning of the language); The Ben R., 134 F. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 1904)
(stating that penal statutes cannot be extended beyond their plain meaning); see also
BISHOP, supra note 47, § 194, at 187 (explaining that strict interpretation requires reading
statutes to only cover acts “which are within both their spirit and their letter” (emphasis
added)); SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, § 350, at 439–40 (“[A penal statute] cannot be made
to embrace cases not within the letter, though within the reason and policy, of the law.”).
54 See BISHOP, supra note 47, § 193, at 185–87 (noting that because lenity’s purpose was
to limit excessive punishments, the “degree of strictness” a court employed would “depend
somewhat on the severity of the punishment” that a statute inflicted); SUTHERLAND, supra
note 46, § 347, at 436 (“The construction will be more or less strict according to . . . the
severity of the penalty . . . .”); see also Randolph v. State, 9 Tex. 521, 523 (1853) (noting
that misdemeanor statutes need not be constructed as strictly as statutes that permit more
severe punishment); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 17 Mass. 46, 49 (1820) (construing the same
language in one statute less strictly than the court had with another statute because the
penalty in one statute did not include the possibility of death).
55 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
56 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
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torical version of strict construction was antithetical to legislative
supremacy; interpreting laws in such a way as to protect defendants
from too-harsh punishment was “not the function of the judiciary.”57
But the rule of lenity that Frankfurter described was not the rule
applied in American courts; his description more accurately referred
to the English rule in which strict construction or benefit-of-clergy
applied as “an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrong-
doers” and sometimes led to narrowing even unambiguous criminal
laws.58 The American rule of strict construction, by contrast, posed no
problem to legislative supremacy because it only came into play if,
after an examination of statutory text and structure, ambiguity
remained.59
In the years since Justice Frankfurter modified the rule of lenity,
the Court has inconsistently applied and further weakened the rule.
Some Justices apply lenity if a “reasonable doubt” remains about the
meaning of a statute,60 while others apply it only when there is
“grievous ambiguity”61 or “when the equipoise of competing reasons
cannot otherwise be resolved.”62 These various formulations seem to
match with familiar standards of proof, such as reasonable doubt,
clear and convincing evidence, and a preponderance of the evidence.
Relatedly, the Court has also been inconsistent about when courts
should invoke the rule of lenity. In most cases, the Court has said that
lenity only applies “after ‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be
derived’”63 in resolving ambiguity, including text, “‘structure, legisla-
tive history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.”64 On the other
hand, some justices have argued, typically in dissent, that lenity should
apply before resort to statutory purpose or legislative history.65 As
57 Id.
58 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 718 (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 596).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 204 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (Marshall, J.)).
61 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (quoting Huddleston v.
United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)); Abramski, 573 U.S. at 188 n.10 (quoting Maracich
v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013)).
62 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 n.13 (2000) (Souter, J.) (posing
the “equipoise of competing reasons” threshold but finding that it had not been met in the
particular case).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (alteration in original)).
64 Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 436–37 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that lenity, rather than legislative history, should have applied);
Moskal, 498 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the rule of lenity means anything, it
means that the Court ought not . . . use an ill-defined general purpose to override an
unquestionably clear term of art . . . .”).
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Intisar Rabb has noted, this “canon drift”—a shift in the doctrine of a
canon—has long characterized lenity jurisprudence.66
The Court’s decision in United States v. Santos67 illustrates the
inconsistent application of lenity. The Court addressed whether “pro-
ceeds” in the federal money laundering statute included only transac-
tions involving criminal profits or also those involving criminal
receipts.68 Justice Antonin Scalia applied the rule of lenity from the
outset of his plurality opinion and noted that lenity “vindicates the
fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to
punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”69 “From the face of the
statute,” Justice Scalia said, there were doubts as to what Congress
intended by the word “proceeds.”70 He rejected what he referred to as
“the impulse to speculate regarding a dubious congressional intent,”
and instead insisted that the Court “interpret ambiguous criminal stat-
utes in favor of defendants, not prosecutors.”71 Justice John Paul
Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, disagreed with this analysis
and would have looked to legislative history before the rule of
lenity.72 Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, argued in dissent
that statutory context and purpose removed all ambiguity and thus the
rule of lenity did not apply.73
Despite Santos, where the plurality applied something closer to
strict construction, the current Supreme Court has largely applied the
weaker version of lenity. It uses the rule of lenity only “after seizing
everything from which aid can be derived,”74 including a statute’s text,
structure, purpose, and legislative history, and even then only if
“grievous ambiguity” (rather than “reasonable doubt”) remains.75
And, in practice, modern lenity has been applied to all penal statutes
66 Intisar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 193 (2018).
67 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
68 Id. at 514.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 515, 519.
72 See id. at 528 (Stevens, J., concurring) (applying the rule of lenity only after
concluding that the legislative history was unclear).
73 Id. at 531 (Alito, J., dissenting).
74 Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016). Prior to Santos the Court
applied the weakened version of lenity with regularity. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993); Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596
(1961).
75 See, e.g., Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1434 n.8; Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429
(2016) (quoting Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 492 (2010)); Shaw v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 462, 469 (2016) (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138–39).
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the same way regardless of their sentencing consequences.76 In Deal,
for instance, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the term “conviction”
has multiple meanings—but found that in the context of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) the meaning of “conviction” was clear and interpreted the
statute in favor of the prosecution.77 He did so even though the
statute, so interpreted, resulted in the defendant being sentenced to
105 years in prison.78
The Supreme Court’s current version of lenity is significantly
weaker than the historical rule of strict construction. With the court
required to exhaust every other interpretive resource before applying
it, lenity plays almost no role in deciding cases of statutory ambiguity.
As Dan Kahan has remarked, “if lenity invariably comes in ‘last,’ it
should essentially come in never.”79 Put differently, if judges possess
every interpretive tool at their disposal to construe away ambiguity,
they will, inevitably, never reach the rule of lenity. And that’s largely
what recent cases illustrate, with the Court refusing to apply the rule
of lenity because it had already resolved any ambiguity by consulting
the text, structure, purpose, legislative history, and all other sources.80
II
THE HISTORICAL RULE OF LENITY IS NORMATIVELY
SUPERIOR TO THE MODERN RULE
The modern rule of lenity rarely decides cases today because
judges construe away even considerable textual ambiguity through
myriad other methods of interpretation. Strict construction is norma-
tively superior to the modern rule because it better advances demo-
cratic accountability, preserves separation of powers, furthers the due
76 See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 961, 968 (2016) (rejecting a rule of
lenity argument despite the broad interpretation resulting in a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence); Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 12–13, 28 n.9 (2010) (rejecting a
rule of lenity argument despite the broad interpretation resulting in a mandatory five-year
sentence stacked on a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence); Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 137 (1993) (rejecting the contention that the rule of lenity should be
employed because the resulting 105-year sentence was “glaringly unjust”); Smith, 508 U.S.
at 239–41 (1993) (rejecting the rule of lenity argument proposed by defendant and the
dissent despite the broad interpretation resulting in a thirty-year mandatory minimum
sentence).
77 Deal, 508 U.S. at 131–32.
78 Id. at 137.
79 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
386.
80 See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 469 (2016); Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at
968; Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014); Robers v. United States, 572
U.S. 639, 646 (2014); United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 172–73 (2014); Barber v.
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010); Smith, 508 U.S. at 239–40; Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
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process principle of fair warning, safeguards defendants’ liberty, and
aligns with the modified form of textualism practiced by much of the
federal judiciary.
A. The Historical Rule of Lenity Advances Democratic
Accountability
The rule of strict construction advances democratic accountability
principles better than the modern, weakened rule of lenity. A stronger
rule of lenity appropriately places the burden of fixing unclarity on the
party most capable of addressing it—the federal government. As
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner write in Reading Law, “when the
government means to punish, its commands must be reasonably
clear,” and “[w]hen they are not clear, the consequences should be
visited on the party more able to avoid and correct the effects of
shoddy legislative drafting—namely, the federal Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) or its state equivalent.”81 In the federal realm, the DOJ
has had unusually great success in convincing Congress to expand the
scope of criminal statutes that the Supreme Court had interpreted
narrowly.82 Matthew Christiansen and William Eskridge found that,
from 1967 to 2011, a significant percentage of congressional overrides
of Supreme Court decisions were lobbied for by the DOJ.83 These
overrides were “decidedly one-sided,” because “[i]f the Department
of Justice believes the Court’s stingy interpretation of a criminal pro-
hibition, penalty, or procedural rule stands in the way of effective
implementation of a criminal law regime, it can typically gain the
attention of Congress and can often secure an override.”84 By con-
trast, criminal defendants and criminal justice advocacy groups do not
have the same sway in Congress to push for overrides of Supreme
Court interpretations that favor the government.85 A stronger rule of
lenity is thus needed to “place[ ] the weight of inertia upon the party
that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly.”86
81 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 299 (2012).
82 See Shon Hopwood, The Misplaced Trust in the DOJ’s Expertise on Criminal Justice
Policy, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2020) (explaining how the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has enormous lobbying power in Congress).
83 Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1321
(2014) (stating that the DOJ and other federal agencies were involved in seventy percent
of the overrides that were studied).
84 Id. at 1383.
85 See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128
YALE L.J.F. 791, 793–95 (2019) (detailing how difficult federal criminal justice reform has
been to obtain in Congress).
86 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
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B. The Historical Rule of Lenity Preserves the Separation
of Powers
Strict construction ensures that the power to define crimes resides
with democratically elected legislatures, rather than courts.87 Federal
courts lack the ability to create common-law crimes.88 This is because
“criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of
the community,” and so, under separation-of-powers principles, “leg-
islatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”89 Since
Congress is far more representative than courts, it is the appropriate
branch to speak for the community in condemning certain conduct.
Strict construction supports rather than undermines legislative
supremacy. Because strict construction has a long history, Congress
has always legislated with it as a background principle.90 The rule is
not inconsistent with legislative supremacy because it only applies
when a statute is ambiguous.91 And unlike several states, Congress has
never legislated away the rule of lenity;92 instead, it has required lib-
eral rather than strict construction for only a handful of statutes,
which implies that it has consented to lenity more generally.93
Strict construction also removes the ability of judges to use “an
ill-defined general purpose” to expand or add to the statutory text.94
That was the principal danger that Chief Justice Marshall warned
against in Wiltberger: courts employing statutory purpose to create
crimes “of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which
are enumerated.”95 Practically, this is always a concern. By the time a
federal appellate judge is faced with an issue about the scope or
breadth of a federal criminal law, the defendant has already been con-
victed and sentenced. Once the justice system already has some for-
ward momentum in adjudging someone guilty, there is an inevitable
inertia to affirm the conviction, even if the statutory text has to be
87 See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 1, at 14–15.
88 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that
federal courts have no criminal jurisdiction, except what is given by statute).
89 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
90 Cf. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 411 (2010) (explaining that the nonretroactivity canon has deep roots and can be
considered a background expectation against which American legislatures have always
enacted legislation).
91 See John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1955, 2000 (2015).
92 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
885, 902–03 (2004) (explaining how many states have explicitly done away with lenity by
directing that statutory provisions be “liberally construed”).
93 Kahan, supra note 79, at 382 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)).
94 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 132 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820).
42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 31 Side B      10/08/2020   07:57:54
42594-nyu_95-4 S
heet N
o. 31 S
ide B
      10/08/2020   07:57:54
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU403.txt unknown Seq: 17  5-OCT-20 8:23
934 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:918
stretched to fit the particular circumstances. Returning to the rule of
strict construction would take away the reviewing judge’s temptation
to affirm and “stretch the law to fit the evil.”96
C. The Historical Rule of Lenity Furthers the Due Process
Principle of Fair Warning
The rule of strict construction also advances the due process prin-
ciple that compels Congress to give “fair warning,” in “language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed.”97 It is a “fundamental principle that no citizen
should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose com-
mands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly
prescribed.”98 Requiring Congress to supply fair warning through stat-
utory text and without resort to other evidence is consistent with
Congress’s intended first-order audience when it drafts criminal
laws—the general public.99 It is also consistent with the textualism
practiced by much of the federal judiciary, which focuses on how the
“ordinary English speaker . . . would understand the words of a
statute.”100 When the intended audience is the general public, legisla-
tive history—an “obscure and inaccessible source of legal knowledge
for lay audiences”—does not help communicate a statutory term’s
meaning.101 That is especially true since the average layperson does
not have a college degree, let alone a law degree.102 An audience of
laypeople should not have to consult extraordinary and largely inac-
cessible non-textual sources, such as committee reports, to understand
what the law prohibits and punishes.103 And a weaker rule of lenity
96 Moskal, 498 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
98 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (“[T]he rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide
fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal . . . .”).
99 Louk, supra note 1, at 160 (stating that criminal statutes are broadly directed at the
general public).
100 Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193,
2194 (2017) (“[I]f the conventions of legislative history or the legislative process reveal that
Congress used language in something other than its natural sense, a textualist court should
not necessarily defer to that meaning. What matters . . . is how the ordinary English
speaker . . . would understand the words of a statute.”).
101 Louk, supra note 1, at 177.
102 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Folly of Requiring Complete Knowledge of the Criminal
Law, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 335, 344–45 (2018) (noting that less than half of adults in the
United States, according to the Census Bureau, had received some kind of college degree
and concluding that a person of ordinary intelligence was not a lawyer, judge, or law
professor).
103 See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 308–10 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the Statutes at
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makes it easier for judges to assert their own views and idiosyncrasies
in interpreting statutes, which can lead to inconsistent applications of
law antithetical to fair notice.104
The Supreme Court’s decision in McBoyle v. United States105 pro-
vides a good example of how historical lenity provides fair warning.
There, the Court confronted the question of whether the defendant’s
conviction (and three-year prison sentence) for transporting a stolen
airplane was valid under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.106 The
Act provided the following: “The term ‘motor vehicle’ shall include an
automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any
other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.”107
Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. held that the
statute’s definition of motor vehicle could technically apply to an air-
plane because it is a “self-propelled vehicle not designed for running
on rails.”108 But he noted that “in everyday speech ‘vehicle’ calls up
the picture of a thing moving on land.”109 Justice Holmes explained
thusly:
[F]air warning . . . [must be] in language that the common world will
understand . . . . When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that
evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on
land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because
it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the specula-
tion that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader
words would have been used.110
Large give adequate notice to the citizen [may be] . . . a fiction, albeit one required . . . but
necessary fiction descends to needless farce when the public is charged even with
knowledge of Committee Reports.” (citations omitted)); Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning
of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 538 (1948)
(arguing against the use of legislative history because most people, and even many lawyers,
do not have easy access to legislative history). It is not just laypeople who are unaware of
committee reports. See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2125–26 (“Given that the President
and the White House staff are not necessarily aware of the committee reports, and given
that Members of Congress in one House may not be aware of reports from the other[,] . . .
it is difficult to call those reports ‘authoritative’ in any formal or functional sense.”).
104 “[T]he decision whether to resort to legislative history is often indeterminate. The
indeterminacy of the trigger greatly exacerbates the problems with the use of legislative
history.” See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2149 (“As a judge, if all you need to . . . pick out
the result that you find most reasonable . . . is a finding of ambiguity, and if there is no . . .
principled way to determine clarity versus ambiguity, then some judges are going to be
more likely to find ambiguity in certain cases.”).
105 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
106 Id. at 25–26.
107 Id. at 26 (citing Act of October 29, 1919, ch. 89, § 2, 41 Stat. 324 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2018))).
108 Id. (“No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance
working on land, water or air . . . .”).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 27.
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The Court in McBoyle considered legislative history and found
that it did not address whether Congress intended for airplanes to be
covered under the statute.111 Had the Court applied the modern rule
of lenity, it would have been forced to scour committee reports and
floor action to see whether Congress intended to criminalize the theft
and transport of an airplane under a statute applied to motor vehicles.
Legislative history does not provide fair warning. Requiring
laypeople to do that level of legal research to ascertain what the law
criminalizes is similar to the “practice of Caligula who ‘published the
law, but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner,
so that no one could make a copy of it.’”112 Because only the text of
the statute is the law, fair warning should be provided by the text in
language that laypeople can understand. Had the rule of strict con-
struction been applied in McBoyle, it would have foreclosed resort to
legislative history and required the Court to address whether the stat-
utory language and structure made it clear to laypeople that the
statute covered the theft and transport of airplanes, which is ulti-
mately what the Court held (even though it did not mention lenity or
strict construction).
D. The Historical Rule of Lenity Better Safeguards
Defendants’ Liberty
Because the more robust rule of strict construction requires a
lower standard of ambiguity, especially when the punishment is
severe, it protects defendants from unfairly harsh sentences, similarly
to how the due process reasonable doubt requirement protects them
at trial.113 A rule that protects defendants’ liberty is of ever greater
importance in an era in which Congress has criminalized huge swaths
of conduct in over 4500 federal laws that often mandate long terms of
imprisonment.114 Congress routinely drafts unclear criminal laws.115 It
sometimes omits key information and fails to define key terms.116 And
members of Congress are often thinking about the worst offenders
when they draft criminal laws, which is why federal statutes are some-
111 Id. at 26 (“Airplanes were well known in 1919, when this statute was passed; but it is
admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in Congress.”).
112 Larkin, Jr., supra note 102, at 340 n.23 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
96 (1945) (plurality opinion)).
113 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (stressing the immensely important
interests at stake in criminal prosecutions for the accused—such as liberty and potential
social stigma—and extolling the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
114 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 695, 703.
115 See id. at 695–96.
116 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 360 (2019).
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times written so broadly they include trivial or innocent conduct unre-
lated to the harms they intend to criminalize.117 Members rely on
prosecutors to use the criminal law’s stiff penalties against only the
“really bad” offenders. Given this drafting dysfunction, one would
think that the federal judiciary would be more careful when inter-
preting such broad and unclear criminal laws. But the judiciary has
been careless or indifferent, and it has applied a version of lenity so
weak that it rarely decides cases.118
E. The Historical Rule of Lenity Aligns with Modified Textualism
Lastly, the rule of strict construction is consistent with the modi-
fied form of textualism. Justice Kavanaugh, a proponent of modern
textualism, has called on judges to seek the “best reading of the
statute”119 by “interpreting the words of the statute, taking account of
the context of the whole statute, . . . applying the agreed-upon
semantic canons, . . . discern[ing] the best reading of the text . . . [and
then] depart[ing] from that baseline if required to do so by any rele-
vant substantive canons.”120 Justice Kavanaugh’s view of statutory
interpretation is entirely consistent with the rule of strict construction.
A judge applying strict construction would look at the statute’s text
and structure (including linguistic canons) to find the best reading of
the statute. The judge would then decide whether that reading would
be clear to laypeople.121 If reasonable doubt remained, the judge
would apply lenity to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant,
especially if the punishment was severe. Applying historical lenity
would provide more predictability and consistency than the current
rule of lenity, where judges have a never-ending amount of informa-
tion to construe away even considerable ambiguity in a criminal
statute.
***
Criminal law deserves to be interpreted differently than other
kinds of law.122 As F. Andrew Hessick and Carissa Byrne Hessick
117 See id.
118 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 702–09.
119 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2121.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 2144 (“Courts should try to read statutes as ordinary users of the English
language might read and understand them. That inquiry is informed by both the words of
the statute and conventional understandings of how words are generally used by English
speakers.”).
122 Statutory purpose and legislative history are appropriate in interpreting other kinds
of laws, where fair warning need not be as great because the consequences to an individual
and their liberty interests are not as great.
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have argued, “[t]he text of the Constitution and various legal doc-
trines demonstrate that our legal system regularly treats criminal laws
differently from other laws.”123 Criminal law is treated differently
under our constitutional system because of the deprivation of liberty
at stake and the need to warn citizens (and not just other lawyers)
about the breadth of conduct that is criminal.124 When someone is
convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison, their life and liberty are
forever altered. American prisons are incredibly violent and
depressing places that largely return people to society worse off than
they were when they entered.125 Even when convicted individuals
finish serving their sentences, the collateral consequences of a felony
are severe and often include legal discrimination in employment,
housing, public benefits, and voting.126 With such great stakes, a judge
trying to determine whether a person’s actions are covered by a crim-
inal statute must take particular care. The historical rule of lenity (i.e.
the rule of strict construction of penal statutes) ensures that judges do
so in a principled and consistent way.
III
THE HISTORICAL RULE OF LENITY SHOULD RECEIVE
CANONICAL STATUS
“Canons of interpretation are rules of construction that courts
apply in the interpretation of statutes.”127 They are properly regarded
as “presumptions about what an intelligently produced [statutory] text
conveys,”128 and they constitute an “interpretive regime,” that act as a
“set of conventional considerations relevant to statutory interpreta-
tion.”129 These strong rules, if followed uniformly, are thought to
ensure “predictability, neutrality, objectivity, and transparency in stat-
utory interpretation.”130
123 F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 19) (on file with authors).
124 Id.
125 See Shon Hopwood, Improving Federal Sentencing, 87 UMKC L. REV. 79, 81–83
(2018) (explaining the harshness of a federal prison sentence).
126 See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (“A person convicted of a crime, whether
misdemeanor or felony, may be subject to disenfranchisement (or deportation if a
noncitizen), criminal registration and community notification requirements, and the
ineligibility to live, work, or be present in a particular location.” (citations omitted));
Hopwood, supra note 125, at 82 (“People with felony convictions may be legally
discriminated against in employment, housing, federal benefits, and voting rights.”).
127 Barrett, supra note 23, at 117.
128 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 51.
129 ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 1, at 20.
130 Id. at 16.
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Does it matter whether an interpretive rule is considered a
canon? The short answer is yes. When an interpretive principle is
labeled a canon, “it inevitably becomes imbued with an aura of legiti-
macy.”131 Once an interpretive rule becomes a legitimate and
respected canon, judges generally apply the canon uniformly going
forward.132 When Abbe Gluck and Judge Richard Posner interviewed
forty-two circuit court judges about their methods of interpreting stat-
utes, they found that “[e]ven though most judges told us they were not
bound to use canons, and many disparaged them, all use them.”133
Not every interpretive rule has attained the status of a canon, and
no one standard has taken hold for deciding which among them
should. Anita Krishnakumar and Victoria Nourse have argued that
canons are defined by their longevity or historical pedigree, their fre-
quency of invocation, their justification, and whether the Supreme
Court has declared them to be generally applicable.134 Justice
Kavanaugh has argued that judges should decide “in advance” which
interpretive rules deserve the status of a canon, and that those
selected should further the principles of consistency and predictability,
because “[l]ike cases should be treated alike by judges of all ideolog-
ical and philosophical stripes, regardless of the subject matter and
regardless of the identity of the parties to the case.”135 Under any of
these metrics, historical lenity should be given the status of a canon.
Canon status should not be bestowed to just any formulation of
the rule of lenity, but specifically to the historical rule of lenity. That
is, once a judge has reviewed the text and structure of a statute and a
reasonable doubt about the scope of the statute remains, lenity should
apply to interpret the statute narrowly in favor of the defendant
without resort to statutory purpose or legislative history.
A. Lenity Has a Long History and Pedigree
Krishnakumar and Nourse have argued that “[h]ow long an inter-
pretive rule has been in effect may be one of the most important fac-
tors in determining whether it qualifies as a canon of statutory
construction.”136 If history and pedigree are the principle bases for
131 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 177.
132 See infra Section III.E (noting that the Supreme Court applies lenity as a rule of
general applicability and that lower courts apply lenity in the same way as the Supreme
Court).
133 Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1334 (emphasis added).
134 See Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 179–90.
135 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2120–21.
136 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 184.
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determining what constitutes a canon, lenity is validated by its “sheer
antiquity.”137
Lenity is one of the oldest canons of interpretation.138 It derives
from the rule of strict construction of penal statutes, which itself
developed out of the thirteenth-century benefit-of-clergy doctrine.139
The interpretive principle was well-established and recognized by
English treatise writers William Blackstone and Thomas Coke at the
time of America’s founding.140 American courts adopted the doctrine
and modified it into the rule of strict construction of penal statutes.141
The rule was never questioned by the Founders142 and was first cited
by the federal judiciary in 1794.143 A few decades later, in Wiltberger,
Chief Justice Marshall provided the Supreme Court’s first extended
discussion of the rule’s benefits and application,144 and the Court has
employed it ever since.145
Lenity’s antiquity is unquestioned. Chief Justice Marshall
described it as “perhaps not much less old than construction itself”146
and Justice Scalia as “almost as old as the common law itself.”147 The
Supreme Court has referred to the rule as “venerable”148 and “well-
recognized.”149 Scalia and Garner suggest that lenity is “so deeply
ingrained, it must be known to both drafter and reader alike so that
137 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29 (1997).
138 Barrett, supra note 23, at 128.
139 See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 110–11, 117–18 (2d ed. 1952); 1
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 457–59
(1883).
140 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88 (establishing that statutory
interpretation of “remedial statutes” limits the remedy to only that which is appropriate to
correct for the initial mischief); THOMAS COVENTRY, A READABLE EDITION OF COKE
UPON LITTLETON §§ 54b, 153b, 238b (London, Saunders & Benning 1830) (distinguishing
the penal law from the common law in statutes concerning “tenant[s],” “rent,” and
“descents that toll entry”).
141 See supra Section I.A.
142 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1057 (2001).
143 Bray v. Atalanta, 4 F. Cas. 37, 38 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 1819).
144 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820).
145 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 547 (2015) (“Finally, if our recourse to
traditional tools of statutory construction leaves any doubt about the meaning of ‘tangible
object,’ as that term is used in § 1519, we would invoke the rule that ‘ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’”).
146 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95.
147 Scalia, supra note 137, at 29.
148 United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992).
149 United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984).
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[it] can be considered inseparable from the meaning of the text.”150
Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett has noted that the “long
pedigree” of substantive canons like lenity “makes it difficult to dis-
miss their use as fundamentally inconsistent with the limits that the
Constitution imposes upon the exercise of judicial power.”151 Perhaps
for this reason, some lower-court judges view lenity as “special” and
distinguish it from other canons “in terms of [its] mandatory
application.”152
B. Lenity Has Been Frequently Invoked by the Supreme Court
and Lower Courts
Frequency of invocation is another sign that a rule is “well-
established and even ingrained in the legal community,” because the
“number or frequency of citations to a rule or other legal source often
is used as a proxy for its status in the legal community.”153 Lenity
easily meets this criterion.
In the decades following the founding, few interpretive rules were
cited with more frequency than the historical rule of lenity. In a recent
article, Judge Barrett reviewed early federal case law that “yielded far
more cases applying the rule of lenity than any other canon,” leaving
“one with the distinct impression that lenity was the most commonly
applied substantive cannon of construction.”154 And starting with
Lawrence155 and running through last year’s decision in United States
v. Davis,156 the rule of lenity has been cited frequently by the
Supreme Court. In fact, Krishnakumar conducted an empirical anal-
ysis of the Roberts Court’s invocation of substantive canons in its first
six-and-a-half terms and found that the rule of lenity was the second
most cited behind constitutional avoidance.157 A search for “strict
150 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 31; see also Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 753, 765 (2013) (“Some substantive canons, such as the rule of lenity . . . have been
justified based on their pedigree. Perhaps one can argue that such rules are so ingrained
that they can be assumed to have been incorporated into congressional drafting practice—
and, in fact, Justice Scalia makes precisely this argument.” (footnote omitted)).
151 Barrett, supra note 23, at 128; see also William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law
of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1127 (2017) (“We . . . would ask whether the
canons were rules of law at the Founding or have validly become law since, pursuant to
rules of legal change that were themselves valid in this way. . . . The rule of lenity probably
passes our test, as it appears to date back to the Founding.”).
152 Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1331–32.
153 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 181.
154 Barrett, supra note 23, at 129 n.90.
155 United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 45 (1795).
156 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019).
157 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
825, 856 (2017) (noting that when the Roberts Court invoked substantive canons, it
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construction” in the same paragraph as “penal” on Westlaw Next
returned seventy-seven Supreme Court cases. A search for “rule” in
the same paragraph of “lenity” returned 174. By contrast, a Westlaw
Next search for citations to the “Charming Betsy” canon158 returned
only thirty-three Supreme Court cases. In addition, a search for “rule”
in the same paragraph as “lenity” in every federal circuit court of
appeals database returned 2802 cases. Lenity has, and continues to be,
frequently invoked.
C. Lenity Is Constitutionally Derived from the Due Process Clause
Another factor that Krishnakumar and Nourse use to determine
whether an interpretive rule should be considered a canon is its justifi-
cation.159 They contend that one justification for receiving canon
status is if a rule is “grounded in a constitutional principle.”160
The rule of lenity helps implement the Due Process Clause’s fair
warning requirement as well as a preference that legislatures, rather
than courts, define crimes.161 Given the seriousness of criminal penal-
ties, people should not languish in prison unless Congress has plainly
and unmistakably provided notice. Because lenity flows from due pro-
cess requirements, scholars have argued that lenity is constitutionally
inspired or derived.162 Even if not mandated by the Due Process
Clause, Gluck has argued that lenity could be viewed as a
“referenced one of just six well-established canons—the avoidance canon (sixteen), the
rule of lenity (eleven), the presumption against preemption (eight), a federalism clear
statement rule (six), the presumption against retroactivity (five), or the narrow
construction of waivers of sovereign immunity (four)”).
158 The “Charming Betsy” canon is the principle that statutes should be interpreted to
avoid conflicting with international law and was introduced in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
159 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 185.
160 Id. at 187.
161 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (stating that lenity helps to
ensure fair warning and that, because crimes have serious consequences, their definition
should be the province of the legislature, not the judiciary); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 348 (1971) (same). Lenity is often said to be rooted in constitutional norms of
procedural due process. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 600 (1992). For another view, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1122 (2017) (“Legal canons don’t need to be recast
as a form of quasi-constitutional doctrine, because they don’t need to outrank the statutes
to which they apply. Instead, the canons stand on their own authority as a form of common
law.”).
162 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 907 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that the rule
of lenity has constitutional underpinnings in the Due Process Clause); Manning, supra note
90, at 406 & n.26 (2010) (arguing that lenity is constitutionally inspired).
42594-nyu_95-4 Sheet No. 36 Side A      10/08/2020   07:57:54
42594-nyu_95-4 S
heet N
o. 36 S
ide A
      10/08/2020   07:57:54
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-4\NYU403.txt unknown Seq: 26  5-OCT-20 8:23
October 2020] RESTORING THE HISTORICAL RULE OF LENITY 943
“Constitution-implementing law.”163 Under such an interpretation,
lenity takes “inspiration and authority from, but is not required by,
various constitutional provisions.”164 On either theory, it is clear that
lenity has constitutional underpinnings.
Lenity is also justified by the instrumental effect it has on the
drafting of legislation. Consistent and robust use of lenity encourages
Congress to clearly specify what conduct is prohibited and what pun-
ishments should be imposed.165 Lenity advances the value of demo-
cratic legitimacy because it forces Congress to write criminal laws,
rather than leaving it to judges, and requires the legislature to take
responsibility for how broadly or narrowly it criminalizes particular
conduct. Finally, lenity places the onus of convincing Congress to
modify unclear criminal statutes on the DOJ, which is in the best posi-
tion to use its enormous lobbying power to push for clearer criminal
laws.166
D. Lenity Is a Rule that Reflects Agreements of Justices Across
Ideological Divides
Another factor that Krishnakumar and Nourse consider in deter-
mining when to bestow canon status is whether a rule “reflects the
agreement of Supreme Court justices appointed by different parties
and across ideological divides.”167 Justices appointed by presidents of
both parties and across the spectrum of theories and methodologies of
statutory interpretation—among them, Justices Scalia, Souter,
Ginsburg, Blackmun, and O’Connor—have applied the rule of
163 Gluck, supra note 150, at 758.
164 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
165 See Hopwood, supra note 6, at 732.
166 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 299 (“When [criminal statutes] are not
clear, the consequences should be visited on the party more able to avoid and correct the
effects of shoddy legislative drafting—namely, the federal Department of Justice or its
state equivalent.”).
167 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 189 (emphasis omitted).
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lenity.168 Perhaps that is why lenity tends to be widely accepted and
rarely condemned.169
E. Lenity Is a Rule of General Applicability Given
Stare Decisis Effect
The last factor that Krishnakumar and Nourse look at is whether
the Supreme Court has declared the rule generally applicable “as
opposed to merely making a comment about its reasoning in the par-
ticular case in front of it.”170 Not only has the Supreme Court declared
lenity a rule that is generally applicable to a host of different cases,171
but lower courts have also given it stare decisis effect.172
168 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J.); United States
v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (“In these circumstances—where text,
structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s position is unambiguously
correct—we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Granderson’s favor.”);
United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992) (Souter, J.) (“It is
proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/
Center’s favor.”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990) (Stevens, J.)
(“Finally, as we have already observed, we are construing a criminal statute and are
therefore bound to consider application of the rule of lenity.”); United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (O’Connor, J.) (“The purposes underlying the rule of lenity—to
promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective
or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress,
prosecutors, and courts—are certainly served by its application in this case.”); Dixson v.
United States, 465 U.S. 482, 491 (1984) (Marshall, J.) (noting that if legislative history
failed to clarify the statutory text, the “rule of lenity would compel us to construe the
statute in favor of petitioners, as criminal defendants”); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S.
381, 400 (1980) (Blackmun, J.) (“Of course, to the extent that doubts remain, they must be
resolved in accord with the rule of lenity.”).
169 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 79, at 349 (“Lenity is almost universally celebrated
among commentators.”); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 280 (1982) (“Although the canons of
statutory construction have received well-merited criticism on grounds of fatuity and
inconsistency, the ‘rule of lenity’ . . . usually escapes criticism as long as unnatural
constructions are avoided.”).
170 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 189.
171 See supra Section III.B.
172 See Rabb, supra note 66, at 182 (stating that some appellate judges “saw [the canon
of lenity] as binding, based on certain ‘constitutional principles’ or ‘rules’ to which judges
must defer”). Many circuit courts employ the rule of lenity that is currently used by the
Supreme Court today, in that lenity only applies after “seizing everything from which aid
can be derived,” and then only if serious ambiguity remains. United States v. Hampton,
633 F.3d 334, 342 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995)); see, e.g.,
United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 733 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that lenity can only be
used when a court decides a statute is ambiguous or uncertain); United States v. Burwell,
690 F.3d 500, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 876 (10th
Cir. 2003) (same).
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F. Lenity, and Particularly the Historical Rule, Advances
the Rule of Law
Justice Kavanaugh has argued that judges should try to settle the
use of interpretive rules “in advance” to make the rules more “pre-
dictable in application” and “make judges more neutral and impar-
tial.”173 In his view, rules should rely primarily on those canons most
“beneficial to the neutral and impartial rule of law, and to the ideal
and reality of a principled, nonpartisan judiciary.”174 The rule of lenity
promotes these goals. Because it can only produce one outcome—the
interpretation most favorable to the defendant—it eliminates a
judge’s ability to interpret a statute idiosyncratically to advance a
judge’s own policy preferences. In a similar vein, it is predictable in
application, because it is applied in every case of ambiguity.
***
In sum, whether construed as constitutional law or as a
Constitution-implementing rule, justified by its antiquity or general
applicability, the rule of lenity has been frequently invoked by judges
interpreting criminal statutes since the founding of the republic. It
should therefore be treated as a canon that all judges must employ
when interpreting ambiguous federal criminal laws.
IV
APPLYING THE HISTORICAL RULE OF LENITY TO THE MOST
DIFFICULT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION QUESTIONS IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Applying a rule of lenity that is closer to the historical rule of
strict construction helps resolve some of the most vexing questions
that arise in interpreting criminal statutes. It can, for instance, resolve
conflicts between dueling canons, provide clear interpretations of stat-
utes with open-texture ambiguities, and prevent courts from con-
struing away considerable textual ambiguity using statutory purpose
or legislative history.
A. Historical Lenity Can Resolve the Ordering Problem
One problem in statutory interpretation is that there is no con-
sistent order in which courts apply various interpretive rules.175 And
while the modern rule has solved the ordering problem by placing
173 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2121.
174 Id.
175 Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 23, at 169.
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lenity last, that means that lenity almost never applies in practice, an
undesirable result for the reasons explained above. The historical rule
of lenity provides a response to this dilemma by firmly placing lenity
after a review of the statutory text (with the application of linguistic
canons) and statutory structure, and definitively resolving the ques-
tion prior to considering statutory purpose and legislative history.176
United States v. R.L.C.177 provides an example of how historical
lenity would narrow an ambiguous statute. In R.L.C., all the Justices
concluded that, based simply on the statutory text and structure, the
statute at issue was ambiguous.178 The case addressed a provision of
the Juvenile Delinquency Act that requires the length of juvenile
detention to be limited to “the maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an
adult . . . .”179 A minor was convicted of involuntary manslaughter,
and the question presented was whether the maximum term of impris-
onment was the three-year statutory maximum for involuntary man-
slaughter under statute or the maximum permitted under the then-
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines range.180 The majority looked to
the word “authorized” to determine whether the statutory maximum
or Guideline maximum applied, and, after “examining the text,”
found the statute ambiguous.181 The three dissenters agreed.182 The
majority, however, proceeded to canvass legislative history and held
that it resolved the ambiguity.183
Justice Scalia dissented, saying that he would have applied a rule
of lenity akin to the historical rule. He noted that this was an unusual
case in which “something said in a Committee Report causes the crim-
inal law to be stricter than the text of the law displays.”184 Under pre-
vious formulations of lenity, he explained that statutory ambiguity
precludes resolution of ambiguity “on the basis of general declarations
of policy” and “legislative history.”185 The Court’s watered-down ver-
176 See supra Section II.C.
177 503 U.S. 291 (1992).
178 Id. at 298; id. at 307 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
179 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(C) (2018).
180 At the time, the maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter was three years.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). By contrast, given R.L.C.’s criminal history score of
Category I, his Guideline range under the Guidelines was fifteen to twenty-one months.
See R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 296.
181 R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298.
182 See id. at 307 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 298–305 (“The legislative history thus reinforces our initial conclusion that
§ 5037 is better understood to refer to the maximum sentence permitted under the statute
requiring application of the Guidelines.”).
184 Id. at 308.
185 Id. (quoting Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990)).
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sion of lenity risked the result that justifies lenity in the first place:
failure to provide fair warning and prevent courts from sending
people to prison on the basis of judge-made law. As to fair warning,
Justice Scalia noted that while resort by average citizens to the United
States Code to determine whether their conduct is criminalized “is
something of a fiction,” that fiction “descends to needless farce when
the public is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports.”186
As for separation-of-powers concerns, he questioned whether a text
that is ambiguous could be made more harsh by resort to legislative
history because committee reports are not “authoritatively adopted”
and do not express the “moral condemnation of the community” in
the same way as the text does.187 Thus, “[w]here it is doubtful whether
the text includes the penalty, the penalty ought not be imposed.”188
The historical rule of strict construction could also resolve the
tension that arises when two linguistic canons conflict to produce rea-
sonable doubts about the meaning of a statute. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Lockhart v. United States189 is a good example. Lockhart
required the Court to interpret an enhanced sentencing provision of
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995, which applied to
defendants with a “prior conviction” arising “under the laws of any
State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward . . . .”190 The case presented
the question of whether the limitation “involving a minor or ward”
applied to every item on the list. The defendant had a prior conviction
for abusing his then-53-year-old girlfriend, but he argued that the
phrase “involving a minor or ward” modified the entire list and thus
exempted his prior sexual abuse conviction involving an adult.191 The
government argued that “involving a minor or ward” applied only to
the last item on the list of predicate offenses (“abusive sexual con-
duct”), and thus the defendant’s prior sexual abuse conviction trig-
gered the sentencing enhancement.192
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the Court, sided with the
government. She invoked the “rule of the last antecedent” canon,
which provides that a limiting clause or phrase “should ordinarily be
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately fol-
186 Id. at 309.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
190 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2018).
191 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 962.
192 Id.
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lows.”193 In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan instead found that the case
turned on a different canon, the “series-qualifier canon,” which pro-
vides a presumption that “a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally
applies to the entire series.’”194
The historical rule of lenity, which applies after consulting the
text and other linguistic canons, would help resolve conflicts like the
one in Lockhart by producing a definitive answer. When the statutory
text and linguistic canons leave a reasonable doubt about the statute’s
meaning, lenity would require courts to interpret the statute in favor
of the defendant, in this case by applying the modifier to the entire
list. And the rule of lenity, unlike many of the other canons and rules
of interpretation, does not have an antithesis. The series-qualifier
canon and the last-antecedent canon at issue in Lockhart invariably
point in opposite directions,195 but there is no equivalent and opposite
rule from the rule of lenity—when it applies, it produces an uncon-
tested outcome.
B. Historical Lenity Resolves Reasonable Doubts Even as to Open-
Textured Criminal Laws and Considers the Intended
Audience of Criminal Laws
Historical lenity narrows a statute when it is ambiguous, meaning
that it has more than one possible meaning. There are, however, dif-
ferent kinds of ambiguity. The problem of “open texture” ambiguity,
so identified by H.L.A. Hart,196 arises when people are incapable of
defining concepts in a way that covers all imaginable possibilities of
fact and law.197 To illustrate this concept, Hart provided the now-
famous example of a law mandating “no vehicles in the park.”198
Drafters of such a law probably would not intend to prohibit ambu-
lances from entering the park, but an ambulance would indeed be pro-
hibited under a literal application of the statute. Open-texture
ambiguity describes the idea that when drafters enact statutory text,
193 Id. at 962–63 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
194 Id. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 147).
195 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950)
(claiming that for every canon there is a dueling canon that points in the opposite
direction); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805–17 (1983) (agreeing with Llewellyn that every
canon has an equal and opposite canon and further arguing that most canons are “just
plain wrong”).
196 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
197 See H.L.A. HART, Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265, 275 (1983).
198 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 196, at 128–29.
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they cannot anticipate all of the circumstances to which it will be
applied.199
One real-life example of an open-textured statute is the provision
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that imposes criminal penalties for inten-
tionally impeding a federal investigation by concealing a “tangible
object.”200 That statute, enacted in an effort to punish corporate fraud,
was at issue in United States v. Yates, a case in which commercial
fishing captain John Yates ordered his crew to throw undersized fish
overboard to hide the evidence of illegal possession.201 The appeal
presented the question of whether the fish counted as “tangible
object[s]” under the statute.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a plurality of the Court,
conceded that the ordinary meaning of tangible object would include
a fish but refused to interpret the statute “beyond the principle evil
motivating [the statute’s] passage.”202 She concluded that the statute
was ambiguous as applied to Yates’s fish, and applied the rule of
lenity.203 Justice Elena Kagan cited, in dissent, dictionary definitions
for the words “tangible” and “object,” and concluded that fish were
quintessentially tangible objects.204 She argued that it was irrelevant
whether Congress had fish in mind when it passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and insisted that Congress was allowed to write a statute with a
“wide scope.”205
Most commentators cite Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion as
representing a purposivist approach and Justice Kagan’s dissent in
Yates as representing standard textualism.206 But there is another way
to think about Yates: the problem was simply that drafters could not
have foreseen that a statute enacted to deal with corporate fraud
would ever apply to throwing out fish, any more than the hypothetical
drafter would have understood an ambulance to be a “vehicle” pro-
hibited from the park. In both cases, lenity provides a clear solution to
the problem of open ambiguity: If the Court is left with a reasonable
doubt about which interpretation was right, lenity applies to narrow
199 See Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117, 122–23
(Anthony Flew ed., 1955) (discussing the open texture of empirical concepts).
200 See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2018).
201 574 U.S. 528, 531 (2015).
202 Id. at 536.
203 Id. at 547–48.
204 Id. at 553, 555 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH TWO FISH RED
FISH BLUE FISH (1960)).
205 Id. at 555–56.
206 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 412 (2015);
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 857, 881 (2017).
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the statute. And employing historical lenity to narrow the statute in
Yates to what a reasonable reader would view as a “tangible object” is
consistent with Congress’s intent to draft laws for an audience of
laypeople.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United States207 is
another example of a broad and open-textured statute that is ambig-
uous as applied to the facts of the case. Carol Bond was prosecuted
for seeking revenge against her husband’s paramour by spreading
chemicals on the paramour’s mailbox.208 The paramour suffered
minor chemical burns on her hand.209 Bond was charged with vio-
lating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which
makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly” to “use . . . any chem-
ical weapon.”210
Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that the statute was ambig-
uous because Congress likely was not thinking about low-scale, rela-
tively unharmful actions like Bond’s when it enacted the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act.211 Interestingly, Justice
Roberts cited to a number of lenity cases that also applied the feder-
alism canon to narrow broad criminal laws that would sweep so
broadly as to make a federal crime out of conduct that is usually pros-
ecuted locally.212 But rather than apply lenity to the Chemical
Weapons Act, the Court employed the federalism canon and insisted
“on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local
crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way
that intrudes on the police power of the States.”213
Although it reached the proper conclusion, the Court should
have used lenity, not the amorphous federalism canon, to narrow the
statute in Bond. When it enacted the Chemical Weapons Act,
Congress used the language “chemical weapon,” which laypeople
would not understand as applying to Carol Bond’s actions. The statute
was ambiguous because it was open-textured and left reasonable
doubts about whether Congress intended it to apply so broadly. The
statute should have been narrowly interpreted not because it intruded
upon states’ rights, but because a broader application would have
exposed defendants to life imprisonment for conduct that Congress
207 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
208 Id. at 852.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 851 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2018)).
211 Id. at 860–61.
212 Id. at 859 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) and Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000)).
213 Id. at 860.
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did not clearly intend to cover and of which citizens were not provided
notice.
CONCLUSION
Academic and judicial discussions have moved away from the
purposivism-versus-textualism debate to the question of how interpre-
tive rules should be applied and which of them should be treated as
canons. In the realm of criminal law, where the liberty interests are
strongest, the rule of lenity should be strengthened and treated as an
interpretive canon. Lenity has a long and ancient pedigree and has
been frequently cited by American courts since the country’s
founding, and its consistent application would advance the principles
of fairness and predictability.
But not just any version of lenity should be canonized. Courts
should apply the historical rule of strict construction of penal statutes,
whereby judges look to statutory text and structure, consider the audi-
ence and the severity of the punishment, and then resolve any reason-
able doubts in favor of the defendant. Only the historical rule,
consistently and robustly applied, can protect defendants from unclear
laws and judges who guess about their scope. In an age where
Congress has enacted over 4500 criminal laws that all too often carry
too-harsh penalties, a canon of lenity would mandate that judges take
great care when determining whether Congress intended to punish the
defendant’s conduct.
